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WAYS OF CRITICIZING THE COURT
Frank H. Easterbrook*
Critics have attacked Supreme Court decisions not only for their
substance, but also for their structure and inconsistency. Professor
Easterbrook responds to these critics by arguing, first, that the
increasing caseload of the judiciary, coupled with the techniques
of Supreme Court case selection, makes more fractured decisions
inevitable. Second, Professor Easterbrook applies Arrow's Theorem
to show that it is impossible for critics to demand consistent decisions from the Supreme Court without requiring it to sacrifice its
essential institutionalnature.

I. INTRODUCTION

T

HERE are two general ways of criticizing the Supreme

Court. First, the critic may propose some fundamental
principles and say that the pattern of decisions or a particular
decision is inconsistent with these principles. He may say, for
example, that constitutional decisions should be based solely
on the words of the document and the contemplation of the
framers, that the Court should make decisions on the basis of
prevailing beliefs about fundamental values, or that the antitrust laws should be interpreted to foster allocative efficiency.
The critic may label decisions inconsistent with these first
principles as wrong or misguided. Practitioners of this method
of criticism base their arguments on documents, proceedings,
and standards external to the Court.
The second method of criticism challenges the performance
of the Court as an institution. The critic may say that the
Court is divided too frequently, does not adequately explain
its decisions, or hands down decisions that are inconsistent
with one another. He may say, in other words, that the Court
is fragmented or disregards precedent.'
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Swarthmore College, B.A., 1970;
University of Chicago, J.D., 1973. I thank Douglas G. Baird, Gerhard Casper, David
P. Currie, Daniel M. Friedman, Henry P. Monaghan, Richard A. Posner, Antonin
Scalia, Thomas J. Scorza, Geoffrey R. Stone, Cass R. Sunstein, James B. White, and
the participants in the Law and Social Theory Workshop at the University of Southern
California Law Center for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. The Law and
Economics Program of the University of Chicago provided support for the research
and writing of this Article.
I I do not consider "time and motion" studies of the Court - for example, analyses
of its caseload and arguments that changes in its jurisdiction or internal procedures
will improve the quality of its decisions. For recent criticism of such studies, see G.
CASPER & R. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1976); Casper &
Posner, The Caseload of the Supreme Court: z975 and 1976 Terms, 1977 SUP. CT.
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This second method is the source of much effective rhetoric
employed by legal scholars and by the Justices themselves.
The critic takes a case, extracts a principle ("value") that
accounts for the outcome - special credit if the "real" value
is not the one the Court professed to employ - and maintains
that in some other case the Court gave different weight to that
value. The critic may say that the Court has disregarded a
duty to follow or overrule the earlier case in order to achieve
consistency, or that it has failed in its obligation to explain the
inconsistency. If, as often occurs, any effort to explain the
apparent inconsistency leads to disagreement among the Justices, the critic may point out that the proliferation of opinions
and the expression of disagreement cause people to doubt that
the Court is following the law rather than its members' whims;
it may be said that too much disagreement diminishes the
Court's prestige, makes its claim to the final say questionable,
or even draws the rule of law into question. The critic has an
especially vulnerable target when the Court combines inconsistency with fragmentation, sometimes to the point of conceding that its decisions are not consistent and cannot be made
2

SO.

I argue in this Article that the second form of criticism is
of limited force; indeed, in some circumstances such criticism
is worthless. (As the ensuing discussion makes clear, though,
I distinguish criticism of the Court as an institution from
criticism of the foibles of particular Justices. I do not mean
to say that it is pointless to criticize a particular Justice for
inconsistency or thick-headedness.) The most powerful challenge to the Court as institution deals with inconsistent decisions, but I want to postpone discussing it. I start with the
milder criticism of divisions within the Court and return in
Part III to the meaning of the demand for consistency.
REV. 87; see also Hutchinson, Felix Frankfurter and the Business of the Supreme

Court, O.T. z946-O.T. ig6z, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 143 (discussing one Justice's suggestions for changes in the internal procedures of the Court). The studies of internal

operating procedures raise questions different from those I examine here.
2 Compare Robbins v. California, ioi S. Ct. 2841 (ig8i) (plurality decision) (marijuana found in wrapped packages under the deck of a station wagon during a
warrantless search of the automobile must be suppressed), with New York v. Belton,
xoi S. Ct. 2860 (ig8i) (cocaine found in a zippered pocket of a jacket in the back
seat of a car during a warrantless search of the automobile is admissible). As Justice
Stevens observed, six Justices thought that the cases required identical treatment, oi
S. Ct. at 2855 & n.i (Stevens, J., dissenting), and Justice Powell, a member of the
majority in both cases, conceded that the principles informing fourth amendment
jurisprudence are confused. Id.

see also United States v. Ross,

at 2847-51 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment);
102

S. Ct. 386 (ig8i) (granting certiorari, Court asks

the parties to brief the question whether Robbins should be reconsidered).
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DIVIDED DECISIONS

Criticism of the Court for being divided is a hardy perennial. Plurality decisions are subject to special scorn. 3 Critics
say that the Court should try harder to reach agreement on a
majority opinion, because plurality decisions deprive the bench
and bar of necessary guidance. Divisions of all sorts, including
too many dissenting opinions, are said to indicate poor draftsmanship and a general lack of collegiality, leadership, or
statesmanship on the Court. 4 The Justices are sensitive to
criticism of this sort; Justice Rehnquist recently filed a spirited,
if solitary, dissent.5
The critics of the Court usually assume that the source of
the disagreement is insufficient discussion or reflection by the
Justices, or perhaps the press of too many cases. Thurman
Arnold once replied that this position showed "an ignorance
of the rules of elementary psychology,"' 6 but this is a weak
response. People often change their views after discussing
problems with others, and the Justices' similar legal backgrounds should make them amenable to each other's persuasion in many cases, even though there is bound to be a residuum of disagreement. Moreover, the Justices believe that a
show of agreement is beneficial to the institution - witness
the efforts to achieve unanimity in Brown v. Board of Education7 and United States v. Nixon 8 - and collegial work and
compromise are essential to the ability of the Justices to agree.
The Justices would decide cases by majority opinions and
3 See, e.g., Davis & Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59; Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court
PluralityDecisions, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 756, 757-60 (i98o); Note, PluralityDecisions

and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127 (ig8i) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Plurality Decisions]; Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions:
A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (I956).
4 See, e.g., P. BATOR, P. M£ISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 82 (2d ed. 1973);
id. at ix & n.2 (Supp. I98I); Cox, The Supreme Court, z979 Term - Foreword:
Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 72-73 (ig8o); Hart,
The Supreme Court, z958 Term - Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959). The latter two articles exemplify a strain of criticism
characterized by Professor White as the school of reasoned elaboration, see White,
The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:JurisprudentialCriticism and Social Change,
59 VA. L. REv. 279 (I973), from a phrase used in H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal
Process i61 (tent. ed. 1958) (available in Harvard Law School Library).
s Rehnquist, "All Discord, Harmony Not Understood": The Performance of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 22 ARiz. L. REV. 973 (1980).
6 Arnold, ProfessorHarts Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1313 (296o).
7 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 678-99 (I975).
8 418 U.S. 683 (1974); see B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN
287-347 (1979).
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reduce the number of dissents if they could do so at reasonable
cost to themselves.
Critics of the institution also sometimes say that disagreement and plurality decisions arise because the Justices are not
particularly good at what they do. If they are dense or uncomprehending, the argument runs, they will not even agree
on what is pertinent to the decisions, let alone on how to
dispose of cases. Yet this argument, too, is unsatisfactory.
Today's Justices are not demonstrably less able than those of
earlier times; nonetheless, the number of dissenting and concurring opinions and plurality dispositions continues to increase. 9 The increase has been especially marked during the
last ten years, although between January 1972 and September
i981 only one new Justice joined the Court. This suggests
that the explanation for the increase in divided and plurality
decisions lies in changes in the conditions under which the
Court operates rather than in the way particular Justices handle their jobs. I offer below some explanations of divided
decisions that depend on such changed circumstances; if these
explanations hold, then the increase in the number of divided
and plurality decisions does not reflect poorly on the Court but
may, instead, show that the Justices have accommodated well
to the new circumstances.
A. The Case Selection Process
It is easy to reach agreement on easy cases, but the Court
does not decide many easy cases. Its certiorari jurisdiction
allows it to select cases that seem interesting or important, the
very cases most apt to produce divisions. Congress has whittled away at the Court's mandatory docket.' 0 It is likely that
9 There were 35 plurality decisions from igoo to i955 and 43 more from 1955 to
1968. From 1969 to ig8i there were 95. In addition to the 88 decisions for this
period collected in Note, PluralityDecisions, supra note 3, at 1147, there were seven
plurality decisions in the i98o Term: Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, io S.
Ct. 2882 (i98I); Robbins v. California, 1oi S. Ct. 2841 (1981); California Medical
Ass'n v. FEC, I01 S. Ct. 2712 (x98I); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182
(i98i); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Michael M.
v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (i981); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302
(i98I). The growth is too great to be accounted for by the increase in the number of
cases the Court has decided on the merits during the period. For data on the number
of cases heard and decided, see Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under
the JudiciaryAct of z925: The Plenary Docket in the x970's, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1709,
1730-34 (1978).

10 Congress has passed the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No.
93-528, § 5, 88 Stat. 17o6, 1709 (I974) (codified as amended at i5 U.S.C. § 29 (1976)),
and the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-644, § 14(a), 84 Stat.

188o, i89o (codified as amended at x8 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976)), to limit authorized
HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 805 1981-1982
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the residual group of discretionary cases contains an increasingly high proportion of the hard-to-decide problems that call
forth divisions.
Some of the discretionary cases involve conflicts among the
circuits, and the process that generates conflicts also generates
divisions on the Court. Lower courts sometimes produce conflicting decisions because they do not do their homework, but
more often conflicts arise because the legal issue is hard and
the Court's precedents appear to look in two (or more) directions. In such circumstances an inferior court will have trouble
anticipating what the Supreme Court would do with the matter. A case thus is hard for the lower courts and produces a
conflict precisely when the Justices will find it hard as well.
Indeed, the Court's docket should contain more and more
difficult cases as time goes on, even if there is no change in
the extent of its control over which cases it will hear. Assume
that some fixed proportion of all cases litigated in court are
"hard." This is a reasonable assumption; parties have an incentive to settle cases to save the costs of litigation, and the
existence of a judicial decision indicates that the parties were
unable to agree on the outcome."1 The pressure to settle cases
strongly influences the attributes of the cases left to judicial
resolution; even if there is no single "hardness index" of litigated cases over the years, it is unlikely that litigated cases
today are significantly easier or harder than those put to judges
twenty or fifty years ago. Now suppose the Justices always
choose the hardest cases for their adjudication. If lower courts
appeals from single district judges. It also has limited the jurisdiction of three-judge
district courts and, consequently, the number of direct appeals under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1253 (1976). Only decisions of federal appellate courts holding state statutes unconstitutional, id. § 1254(2), decisions of state courts upholding state statutes against
federal constitutional challenge, id. § 1257(2), decisions holding federal statutes unconstitutional in certain cases, id. §§ 1252, 1257(1), and some cases involving reapportionment, the Voting Rights Act § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976), and the Federal
Election Campaign Act § 314, 2 U.S.C. § 437h(b) (1976), now may be appealed
directly to the Court.
The effects are striking. In the i98o Term, the Court issued 138 full opinions, of
which 21 (or 15%) involved appeals. The Court issued 16 opinions after granting
certiorari and one on original jurisdiction. In the 1969 Term, by contrast, the Court
issued 94 full opinions, of which 31 (or 33%) involved appeals. Only 6i opinions
were issued in certiorari cases and two in original jurisdiction cases. Some of the
appeals in the i98o Term were from leftover three-judge courts; the number of
appealable decisions should decline still further in the future. (The opinion counts
are the author's, from a survey of the United States Reports and the Supreme Court
Reporter.)
II For a short description of the circumstances that influence the settlement-versuslitigation decision, see Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, ContributionAmong Antitrust
Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & ECON. 331, 353-64 (1980).
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dispose of ooo cases per year, and two percent (twenty cases)
are genuinely hard, then only twenty percent of the Court's
docket will be hard if it hears ioo cases per year.
As the number of cases decided in the lower courts increases, so too does the proportion of the Supreme Court's
docket that is hard. If lower courts dispose of 50,000 cases
every year, and iooo (the same two percent) are hard, the
Supreme Court will be inundated with tricky, division-creating
problems. The more carefully the Court selects the hard cases
from among those presented to it, the more divided it will
become when addressing the merits. It would not help the
Court to hear fewer cases; the whole docket still would be
hard. Nor would it help to interpose another layer of appellate
courts.
The number of cases handled by the lower courts has
indeed increased. 12 That alone is enough to explain why divisions have multiplied. Moreover, it may well be that the
proportion of litigated cases that must be called hard is increasing. As I explain in Part Ill, the Court is bound to
produce a steady (and perhaps steadily increasing) stream of
inconsistent decisions. As the number of these inconsistent
precedents grows, a higher percentage of all legal disputes
becomes hard to resolve; a judge almost always will find that
one or another of the inconsistent decisions supports each
party. Once it becomes difficult to decide any case without
dishonoring at least one precedent13 (or the values implicit in
that precedent), all cases are hard.
B. The Guidance Process
Professor Cox suggests that "[a] greater effort to obtain
consensus, perhaps by shortening opinions and limiting them
to points of common agreement, might beneficially reduce the
volume of concurring and separate opinions." 14 Doubtless the
Court can agree on a result more easily than five or more
Justices can agree on the many propositions of law and logical
steps that make up a full opinion. The Court's attempt to
provide reasoned explanations for its decisions thus contributes
to the extent of disagreement among its members. But the
assertion that it is "beneficial" to write skeletal opinions in
12 The courts of appeals terminated 3434 appeals in 194o; they terminated 20,887

appeals in sg8o. 198o AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. i.
13 There may be other reasons why cases are hard to decide. Certain questions
expose fundamental moral tensions in society, and other questions are hard because
they are novel. It seems unlikely that hardness from these sources decreases over
time.
14 Cox, supra note 4, at 72.
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order to obtain more agreement is dubious. Indeed, Professor
Cox evidently does not believe his own prescription, for on the
same page he complains that the Court's "opinions often lack
the full exposition necessary to fit the decisions into a coherent
body of law." 15
The Court's critics cannot have things both ways. The
Court cannot be wrong both in saying too much and in explaining too little. True, the author of a particular opinion
(who is often a law clerk attempting to execute poorly understood instructions) may be maladroit, and his clumsy attempt
at "full exposition" may provoke concurring and dissenting
opinions, but surely this is not the dominant cause of disagreement among the Justices. More commonly, "full exposition" and disagreement coincide because the more the Court
tries to explain the nature and limits of its principles, the more
targets for disagreement it presents. It is appropriate to criticize the opinion by saying that a given point is wrong, but it
is bootless to attack because the Justices attempt to explain.
That some reasons will be mistaken or opaque, and that even
the author of the opinion will say so on occasion,1 6 is just a
risk of the business. A good lawyer learns to read the Court's
opinions with the possibility of mistake in mind and to distinguish casual or unconsidered assertions from the propositions
that have received the attention and assent of the Court.
One man's "full exposition" is another man's obiter dictum,
and I do not want to defend the practice of filling opinions
with detours and excursions. Nonetheless, a complete statement of the Court's rationale, of all major and minor premises
necessary to the decision, or of the limits of the holding may
be invaluable. The more the Court says, the more help it
offers in planning. Longer and more detailed opinions are a
rational and desirable response by a Court that cannot significantly increase the number of cases it hears but wants to offer
guidance on the increasing number of problems it must address.17 The Court's effort to offer more guidance through
fuller statements of its governing principles in turn provokes
Is Id.
16 See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.), overruling
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (i975) (Rehnquist, J.).
17 Sometimes the need to offer guidance arises from the Court's earlier decisions.
It could have eliminated a hundred thorny problems by deciding Roe v. Wade, 4X0
U.S. 113 (i973), the other way, as it should have done. See Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wof. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive
Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 259. But
often the Court is dragged into the fray when Congress passes a statute saying, in
effect: "This is a problem, please do something about it." See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY,
BENCHMARKS 41-64 (i967).
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disagreement, but this must often simply supply evidence that
the Court is adapting (well) to the fact that it can hear a
smaller and smaller portion of all disputes. 18
This also means that there is nothing intrinsically wrong
with long opinions, written in several parts, joined by different
coalitions of Justices in each part.19 These opinions often are
attacked as displays of useless erudition suitable only for law
reviews, but it is hard to understand the force of this criticism.
Long opinions may be difficult for the bench and bar to interpret, but they are no more difficult to deal with than a series
of short opinions, each sketching (modestly and tentatively) an
approach to a smaller part of the problem.
Now the Court frequently has a choice of ways to approach
a problem, and this may be a source of disagreement. Again
and again the Court fractures because some Justice wants to
announce a bright line rule governing many similar cases while
others conclude that a balancing or "totality of the circumstances" test is proper. 20 Each of these approaches has dis18

There are, of course, other explanations for divided decisions. One is that some

or all Justices spurn principles of stare decisis. I consider in Part III the role stare
decisis plays in producing consistent decisions. Another is that some or all Justices
engage in "substantive reasoning," Note, Plurality Decisions, supra note 3, at 114044; that is, that the Justices reassess the wisdom of enactments on the basis of their
own principles of The Good (or principles they attribute to current, enlightened
thought) rather than on the basis of principles drawn from statutes and the Constitution. Substantive reasoning produces divisions because no Justice has the means to
persuade another that he is wrong; assertions about the content of natural law cannot
be "wrong" in the customary sense. For a compelling demonstration, see Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). A related source of division is the use of
"values" reasoning: the Justice infers from a constitutional provision or prior holding
the "values" it supports and then uses the values so extracted as a premise in an
argument for some additional result. This method of reasoning leads to indeterminate
results because the Justices have no way to agree on the weight to be attached to
these values. Once the reasoning process is cut loose from the text and its history,
the Justices are practically compelled to decide cases on the basis of their notions of
The Good. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 145 (,973) (Stewart,
J., concurring) (discussing "the dangers that beset us when we lose sight of the First
Amendment itself, and march off in blind pursuit of its 'values"'). Metromedia, Inc.
v. City of San Diego, ioi S. Ct. 2882 (I981), in which the Court tried to decide
whether the value of commercial advertising exceeds the value of reducing the number
of eyesores - in exactly the way a legislature would have weighed these values provides a sufficient illustration. I do not, however, view objections to substantive
reasoning or to values reasoning, and to the divisions they produce, as objections to
the performance of the Court as an institution. They are more properly classed as
objections, based on first principles, to the Court's premises and conclusions. If
substantive reasoning is a legitimate method of deciding cases, then it is wrong to
criticize the Court for the disagreements that are bound to ensue.
'9 See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
20 All of the recent cases under the religion clauses fall within this group, as do
the recent decisions evaluating the constitutionality of capital punishment. These
cases feature two bright line tests and a balancing approach between them. See, e.g.,
HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 809 1981-1982
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tinctive costs and benefits, and in any given case a strong
argument might be made for either. 2 1 Neither is likely to be
"right" in the sense that rational Justices would be required to
assent if only they thought long and hard enough. When such
disagreements develop among the Justices, the only compromise that would produce a semblance of agreement is for the
bright line adherents to yield to the balancing adherents.
Those favoring a bright line may believe that, after further
exposure to the problem, their colleagues will be more willing
to adopt a clear line of demarcation; certainly a balancing test
will produce plenty of litigation that the bright
line adherents
22
can use in arguments with their colleagues.
Few would argue that the Court should conceal the disagreement and issue an opinion adopting a balancing test.
That would simply mislead bench and bar about the actual
state of affairs and deny them information pertinent to future
developments. It would conceal a position that may prevail
after repeated litigation and conceal as well information about
23
how some Justices would weigh the factors to be balanced.
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (establishment clause); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (i976) (death penalty); cf. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451
U.S. 182 (i98i) (inquiry into racial or ethnic prejudice on voir dire for trial on charge
of violent crime between members of different racial or ethnic groups); Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (relevance to entrapment defense of predisposition
to commit crime).
21 See Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 257 (i974); LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. CT. REv. 127.
22 Balancing approaches make the application of legal rules less certain. It becomes difficult to know how the case will be decided until the evidence has been
introduced and the judge has ruled. Indeed, some balancing tests can be read as
signals to the lower courts that just about any decision will be acceptable in a given
case. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (announcing a balancing test
for speedy trial clause cases). The decrease in certainty will produce more litigation,
and a greater proportion of the litigated cases will be tried rather than settled. For
the technical argument about why uncertainty increases litigation and discourages
settlement, see Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note ixi.
23 Such concealment is a matter of policy in many continental courts, which
regularly issue unanimous per curiam opinions no matter how deep the division within
the court. But this show of unanimity often comes at the expense of reducing the
opinion to a string of homilies or, as one scholar put it, "abstract" propositions. J.
WETTER, THE STYLES OF APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS 26 (1960). It is doubtful,

too, that the tradition of unanimity in these courts produces a cohesive body of law.
The German Constitutional Court, for example, has decided both that the government
must provide subsidies for academic research, 2o Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
56 (1966) (interpreting GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 21(i)), and that the government is
forbidden to provide subsidies for political parties, 35 BVerfG 79 (1973) (interpreting
GG art. 5(3)). In each case the court relied on a constitutional provision declaring
that the activity in question must be free ('frei"). In the case of research, free meant

HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 810 1981-1982

1982]

CRITICIZING THE COURT

And the concealment would not affect the disposition of the
case in any material way. When one group of Justices explicitly endorses a bright line test and another adopts a balancing approach, the balancing approach prevails under the
principle that the holding of a case in which there is no majority opinion is "'that position taken by those Members24 who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."'
Once more, I do not argue that the Court's displays of
division are costless. But critics who treat division as undesirable per se, or as evidence of the Justices' sloth or lack of
aptitude, are out of line. Divided decisions stem in large
measure from circumstances beyond the Court's control, and
they go hand in hand with the attempts at reasoned explanation that most of the Court's critics endorse. There will be,
at any given time, some optimal amount of division, and that
amount rises as the proportion of all cases reviewed by the
Court falls.
Il-. INCONSISTENT DECISIONS
A. Introduction
Everyone thinks that the Court should be consistent. Consistency is, it seems, an essential attribute of any institution
that decides on the basis of statutes, constitutions, and criteria
other than the Justices' preferences. The Court cannot logically say in December that a criminal defendant has a "valued
right" to a jury verdict and in May that the deprivation of this
right is irrelevant. 2 5 Similarly, it cannot say that freedom of
"at no cost to the researcher"; in the other case, free meant "with no risk of government
control." The court did not attempt to reconcile the decisions.
24 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (unanimous in relevant part)
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell
& Stevens, JJ.)).
25 Compare Bullington v. Missouri, ioi S. Ct. 1852 (ig8i) (prosecutor may not
seek an increase in the defendant's penalty at a separate trial, which will be held
anyway in light of other events), with United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117
(198o) (prosecutor may appeal in order to seek an increase in the defendant's penalty).
Six Justices thought that Bullington and DiFrancesco, which were decided five
months apart, raised identical problems; three Justices did not, and their views carried
the day. Both decisions were 5-4. See Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy:
Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1001
(198o); see also Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978
SU'. CT. REv. 8i (analysis of the Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence and an
argument that it contains a tangle of inconsistent values given arbitrary (and shifting)
weights).
Other lines of precedent have similar problems. Compare Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
U.S. 5i (1973) (holding unconstitutional, on ground that it impairs voters' freedom of
HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 811 1981-1982
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speech is a more important constitutional value than a defendant's right to a fair trial, that fair trial is more important
than military preparedness, and that military preparedness is
more important than free speech. To do so is to say that at
least one decision is wrong or that they do not rest on the
same document. Thus, the propositions that decisions must
be consistent, that principles must be followed unless the decisions announcing them are overruled, and that decisions rest
on principles of general applicability are put by the Court's
critics as logical implications of the proposition that the Court
is supposed to follow statutes and a written Constitution. If

this is so, an inconsistent Court is a willful, irresponsible
Court.26

Yet while admitting that it is bound by the written documents, the Court continues to hand down inconsistent decisions, to dishonor precedents, and to change the weight attached to particular constitutional and statutory provisions or
the values derived from them. Perhaps the Justices are hood-

winking us (or themselves) in asserting that they are governed
by rules external to their preferences, but fraud of this sort
cannot account for all of the inconsistencies. Some scholars
defend the Court by saying that inconsistencies arise because

the Court tries to write narrowly,2 7 and its work cannot be
consistent (or clear) when there are intervals of time between

very short steps.2 8 Others say that the Court fails because the
association, a statute prohibiting those who have recently voted in one party's primary
from voting in another's), with Democratic Party v. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981)
(holding unconstitutional, on the ground that it impairs the regular party members'
freedom of association, a statute requiring the party to accept delegates selected under
a system that allows voters to choose on the spot in which party's primary to participate).
26 For representative statements of the position, see Hart, supra note 4, at 99;
Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. I, 7 (I979);
Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-MeaningRule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1315 (i975);
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. i,
11-12 (1959). For a less representative, but no less effective, challenge to the Court's
claim to exercise authority when it acts inconsistently, see F. RODELL, WOE UNTO
You, LAWYERS! 63-99, 119-34 (I939). The demand for consistency (which is strongest
when used to challenge the Court's assertion of authority) frequently is translated into
judgments about the propriety of particular decisions. For two especially bald arguments of the form: "Case A gives one weight to a constitutional value and case B
another; therefore, the first-decided or last-decided case is wrong," see Findlater,
Retrial After a Hung Jury: The Double Jeopardy Problem, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 70,
(ig8i) (first-decided case wrong); Perry, Why the Supreme Court was Plainly Wrong
in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L.
REv. 1113 (i98o) (last-decided case wrong). The Court itself sometimes adopts this
rhetoric. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
27 See Arnold, supra note 6, at 1312.
28 See, e.g., Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 349-50 (I974).
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Justices are not up to the arduous tasks. Still others say that
consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds, that "technical
legal theory stands . . . in the way of progress" and should be
disregarded.29 This position essentially holds that the Court
is not bound by the past (however recent), even if part of the
past is embodied in apparently authoritative written com30
mands.
I, too, seek to explain the Court's performance, but I offer
a different perspective. Inconsistency is inevitable, in the
strong sense of that word, no matter how much the Justices
may disregard their own preferences, no matter how carefully
they may approach their tasks, no matter how skilled they
may be. I do not argue that consistency is always impossible.
Some disputes may be resolved in consistent ways, and doubtless much inconsistency is attributable to slipshod work. But
demands for perfect consistency can not be fulfilled, and it is
inappropriate to condemn the Court's performance as an institution simply by pointing out that it sometimes, even frequently, contradicts itself.
The argument in the following pages is based on the developing theory of public choice. The theory is an outgrowth
of the work of Kenneth Arrow, whose book Social Choice and
Individual Values, published in 1951,31 prompted an explosion
of work by economists and political scientists that has become
a separate discipline. 32 Arrow's followers began to examine
with great care the operation of all systems for making collective choices: that is, methods of pooling individual preferences
and decisions to arrive at a decision for the group. This work
almost always concerns voting mechanisms, and the practitioners of the discipline commonly assume that there are no
constraints on the choice of the voters, that people vote their
preferences. But the theory is not limited to such unrestrained
29 See Arnold, supra note 6, at 1310.
30

For arguments from a similar perspective, see Brest, The Misconceived Quest

for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Parker, The Past of
ConstitutionalTheory -And its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981); Tushnet, Legal
Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205 (1981). For effective answers
to arguments of this sort, see Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 353 (1981); Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial

Review (Book Review), 59 TEX. L. REV. 343 (1981) (reviewing J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST (1980)).
31 K. ARRow, SOcIAL

CHOICE AND

INDIVIDUAL VALUES

(2d ed.

1963).

The

second edition recasts several aspects of the analysis and replies to some critics. Id.
at 92-120.
32 Mueller has written an excellent, nontechnical survey of the literature. D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979). In the rest of this paper, I rely on many propositions and
proofs from the public choice literature without attributing them to the technical work;

the reader may find summaries of the proofs in Mueller's book.
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preference voting; it may be applied as well to institutions
whose voters are bound by some constraints.
The theory of public choice is new, and its discipline is
unfamiliar to most lawyers. I know of only three lawyers who
have brought public choice principles to bear on the legal
system. 33 They used these principles to show that courts and
agencies cannot simultaneously satisfy all demands made of
them; they did not, however, discuss how courts combine the
conclusions of judges to produce legal rules. Moreover, the
economists who work in the public choice field have not discussed the courts, and political scientists who study the courts
have not used the fulcrum of public choice principles. 34 Because the impossibility theorem proved by Arrow will strike
many as counterintuitive, I want to begin the discussion with
some propositions about voting and decisionmaking that predate Arrow, and then return to his general impossibility result.
B. Some Paradoxes of Voting
The Court decides cases by majority vote. Its ability to
make consistent, principled decisions therefore depends on the
existence of a system of voting that produces such outcomes.
Yet voting systems are subject to many problems. First, decisions produced by voting will tend to be unstable even when
33Epstein, Voting Theory, Union Elections, and the Constitution, x8 NOMOS:
DUE PROCESS 333 (i977); Levine & Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implicatons, 63
VA. L. REV. 561 (1977); Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice Processes: An Application of
Public Choice Theory to Bakke, the FCC, and the Courts, 88 YALE L.J. 717 (1979);
Spitzer, Radio Formats by Administrative Choice, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 647 (ig8o);
Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation and Deregulation: The Political Foundation of
Agency Clientele Relationships, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., winter 1981, at 147.

Plott and Weingast are economists.
The article by Levine and Plott demonstrates the importance of the order in which
things are decided and suggests the importance of public choice principles for other

legal problems, including decisionmaking by courts. Levine & Plott, supra, at 563,
593-94. weingast applies public choice principles to the relationship between Congress and regulatory agencies. Epstein and Spitzer use public choice to show that
agencies cannot simultaneously fulfill all demands made of them, even though the
demands appear reasonable taken singly.
34 Political scientists' studies of courts have concentrated on measuring the rate of
agreement among judges and determining whether these agreements were associated

with socioeconomic status, political background, or other similarities. More recent
work also has studied the methods of reaching agreement and of exercising influence

through judicial office. See, e.g., S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1976); W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964); D. PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
(1980); D. ROHDE & H. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1976). Murphy
notes the existence of path dependence but does not elaborate, W. MURPHY, supra,
at 86-87; the others do not mention any public choice principles.
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the same voters participate in all decisions; second, the sequence in which issues are decided frequently controls the
outcome of the process; third, any voting system can be manipulated by people who do not honestly state their positions.
i.

Cycling. -

Majority voting systems may be unstable

when there are more than two possible outcomes and different
voters do not rank the outcomes in the same order. An example illustrates the problem.
Suppose the Justices have studied the establishment
clause, 35 and different Justices reach different conclusions
about the meaning of that provision. I assume here, and
throughout this Article, that each Justice comes to his own
position after a process of reasoning deemed adequate and
legitimate by traditional standards - that is, the positions are
based on a study of the language and history of the clause and
a careful analysis of the Court's earlier decisions, and each is
internally consistent. I also assume that, in deciding a case,
each Justice operates independently; each listens to, but is not
bound by, the arguments of any other, and each votes according to his own conclusions. Three Justices conclude that all
public acts that directly or indirectly aid religion violate the
clause; call this position A for absolutism. Three more conclude that any public act is constitutional if it is neutral between religious and nonreligious associations (N for neutrality).
The remaining three conclude that the clause requires balancing, in which the purpose of the act, its effect on religion, and
the extent of entanglement between state and religion all play
a role (B for balancing). It is a detail that three Justices have
each position; the problem would be the same (although the
presentation would be more complicated) if the numbers were
different and there were more than three interpretations of the
clause.
Each group of Justices, moreover, has a preference between
the two positions taken by the others. The Justices who take
position N (neutrality) may believe that position B (balancing)
more accurately reflects the design of the framers and the
Court's cases than does position A (absolute ban on aid). The
Justices who take position B may conclude that A is more
nearly correct than N. And the Justices who take position A
may conclude that N is more nearly correct than B. This last
is not as odd as it first appears: these Justices conclude that
the clause embodies a bright line test and that any attempt at
balancing is worse than either bright line test because it im35 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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merses the Court in the details of a process properly left to
the legislature.
The Justices thus hold the following legal positions:

Group of Justices

Legal Position
(by order of
preference)

1

2

3

A
N
B

B
A
N

N
B
A

When a case under the establishment clause comes before the
Court, the Justices always vote according to their conclusions.
But this voting will not lead them to agree on a rule, no
matter how they go about the task. They cannot settle on rule
A, because the Justices in groups 2 and 3 (a majority) believe
that rule B is a more accurate construction of the clause than
rule A. Yet rule B cannot be chosen either, because a majority
(those in groups i and 3) would select rule N over rule B.
And, to complete the cycle, a majority (in groups i and 2)
would select rule A over rule N. No matter what the Court
does, a majority would always vote to change the rule.
Cycling of this sort is inescapable when the Justices vote
independently and two other conditions hold. First, no position is held by five Justices and at least one Justice holds each
of the three positions. This is often true, because many legal
problems admit of three or more plausible legal positions, and
the method of the Justices' appointment ensures that most
36
plausible legal positions find some support on the Court.
Second, the Justices hold "multi-peaked" preferences - in
other words, the Justices do not rank the options in the same
sequence. If the Justices substantially agree on the ranking of
the choices other than their own, the results of voting will be
stable. In the example presented above, if group 3 ranks the
options N, A, B, then the Court will settle on rule A. Cycling
will be troublesome to the extent that legal disputes are characterized by multi-peaked preferences, a subject I postpone to
Section C of Part III.
Although I have used an example of cycling that involves
a plurality decision, such opinions are not an essential ingredient. Cycling is produced by the conclusions of the Justices,

36

See infra pp. 826-27.
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not by how they express these conclusions. Even if they paper
over the differences, say by agreeing on an opinion expressing
the views of whichever group holds the deciding votes in a
given case, that will not prevent a different group from holding
the deciding votes in a different case. In such circumstances
multiple opinions become desirable because of the additional
information they provide to the parties, as I observed in Section B of Part II.
2. Path Dependence.

-

The example I have just given

may appear to overlook stare decisis. 37 Perhaps the Justices
can reach and adhere to a single rule if they modify their
positions, over time, by respecting the holdings of intervening
cases. My assumption that the Justices continue to vote in
accordance with their original conclusions seems to make stare
decisis pointless. I do not hold that position.
Stare decisis serves valuable functions when there are but
two tenable legal conclusions. A doctrine of adherence to rules
prevents changes in the composition of the Court from defeating settled expectations, and rule-adherence in general reduces
the risks people must endure in planning their activities. Ruleadherence is in the Justices' interest, too, because it shields
them from incessant importunings to change the rules; people
are less likely to file suits when they know that they must
convince the Court to change the rules and it has announced
its unwillingness to do so. Moreover, each Justice may find
it advantageous to follow rules announced by his predecessors,
so that successors will follow his rules in turn. Stare decisis
38
thus enhances the power of the Justices.
Even so, stare decisis as a doctrine is of limited utility.
The fact that the Justices have reached a given conclusion
once is good evidence that they would do so again, with or
without the aid of a formal doctrine of rule-adherence; knowledge of the likely adverse result would discourage people from
continuing to test the settled rule. A rigid application of a
doctrine of rule-adherence would prevent the Court from correcting plain blunders, while a flexible application of the doctrine (to allow blunder correction) reduces the doctrine to

37 I use "stare decisis" here to refer to a doctrine that precludes the reassertion of
legal arguments raised (by the parties or the courts) and rejected after consideration.
The doctrine has not been used to preclude arguments that "merely lurk in the record,
neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon." Webster v. Fall, 266
U.S. 507, 511 (1925); see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 480-81 & nn.14, x5 (1976);

United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37-38 (1952).
38 See Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,
19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 273 (1976).
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shambles by stripping it of the power to insulate rules from
39
challenge and change.
Whatever one's view of the doctrine, stare decisis does not
offer a solution to the problem of cycling when there are three
or more plausible legal positions. Suppose the first case under
the establishment clause, in the example from the previous
Section, pitted one party urging rule A against another urging
rule N. Rule A would prevail. But it would not make sense
to say that stare decisis should be invoked to insulate rule A
from further consideration. That would make the prevailing
rule depend on the fortuity that the lawyers for the parties in
the first case urged only rules A and N, not rule B. To invoke
stare decisis to close the debate after the first case is to make
the choice of constitutional doctrine essentially arbitrary.
To make matters worse, the conjunction of stare decisis
and multi-peaked preferences would aggravate the problem of
path dependence. If rules A and N were debated and rule A
prevailed, the lawyers in the next case would introduce rule
B. Under principles of stare decisis, rule N, the loser in the
previous case, would be out of consideration, while rule B
would be an allowable outcome because it was not previously
rejected. Rule B would prevail over rule A. Rule B would
stand because all other rules would have been rejected; nonetheless, if rules B and N had been urged by the parties in the
first case, rule A would have emerged as the eventual winner.
There are many other possible paths of decision, each leading
to a result that is arbitrary or even bizarre.
One of the most interesting findings of the public choice
literature is that the decisions of any group are sensitive to the
order in which it considers the options. One theorem states
that it is possible to construct a decision path that ends with
any rule, as long as each step is taken by majority vote and,

39 Stare decisis is applied so loosely that it seems fair to say that it does not exist
The Court frequently changes rules it views as mistaken, invoking

as a doctrine.

stare decisis only when the first decision induced substantial detrimental reliance.
Compare Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (I972) (using stare decisis to exempt baseball

from antitrust), with Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
(overriding stare decisis to find municipal corporation liable under 42 U.S.C. § I983
(Supp. I1

1979)), and Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (i979) (stare decisis used to

find that § 1983 does not abrogate iith amendment immunity of the states); compare
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (I977) (stare decisis used), with Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (previously announced per se

rule of antitrust liability overruled). See generally K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION 77-91 (ig6o) (collecting ways of following or dispatching precedent);
Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright.: The "Art" of Overriding, 1963 SuP. CT. REV. 2ii

(same); supra note i6; infra note 56.
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at every step, earlier decisions are respected. 40 Majority voting
plus stare decisis is thus a formula under which the Court may
produce any outcome favored by any number of Justices, however small, even though a majority of Justices would reject
that rule if they could do so on the basis of first principles.
An example may be helpful. Courts often proceed by resolving one question and then deciding whether another question is sufficiently like the first that it should be treated in the
same way. For instance, the Court may hold that a constitutional right of privacy prevents the states from prohibiting
abortions during the first two trimesters. Someone then asserts
that the same constitutional right of privacy disables the states
from prohibiting any form of sexual conduct between (among?)
consenting adults. The Court, adhering to stare decisis, puts
out of mind any question about the propriety of the abortion
decision and asks: Are the cases identical under the privacy
analysis used in the abortion case? Answering "yes," it holds
all laws regulating sexual conduct to be unconstitutional.
Now reverse the order of decisions. First, the sexual conduct case arises. The Court holds that there is no constitutional right of privacy broad enough to ban state regulation of
such conduct. Then it holds that the same principles apply to
abortion, which means that states may prohibit abortion.
The example does not depend on any implausible assumptions. Assume that three Justices have a very broad view of
constitutional privacy, three conclude that the Constitution
never protects privacy in sexual matters, and three conclude
that the Constitution requires a sensitive balancing of privacy
and other interests. The last three, and only they, would
conclude that the abortion and sexual conduct cases present
different problems. Thus, six Justices (and the Court) will
hold that the cases must be treated identically, but the way
they will be treated will depend on which case comes up first,
because the order of presentation determines the votes of the
three Justices who would distinguish the two statutes.
The upshot of stare decisis is that the meaning of the
constitutional right of privacy is uncertain; everything depends
on the fortuitous order of decision. 4 1 Yet this is plainly un40

McKelvey, General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting

Models, 47 ECONONMaTRICA 1085 (1979). For an illustration in which the authors, by
manipulating the order of decisions, caused a flying club to buy planes that only a

minority of members wanted, see Levine & Plott, supra note 33, at 571-81, 600-04.
4' The problem of path dependence is especially visible when the Court must make
two or more decisions in a single case. Take, for example, Apodaca v. Oregon, 406
U.S. 404 (1972). The case posed the question whether the Constitution requires jury
unanimity in state criminal cases. The Court had held in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
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satisfactory; no sensible theory of constitutional adjudication,
interpretive or noninterpretive, allows such happenstance to
determine the course of the law. The order of decisions has
nothing to do with the intent of the framers or any of 4the
2
other things that might inform constitutional interpretation.
The best way out of the trap of path dependence (but not
out of the problem of cycling) is to relax or abandon stare
decisis when there are three or more competing positions. This
is essentially what the Court has done, and the result is exactly
what the critics decry: plurality decisions with each of three
(or more) positions expressed; Justices who adhere to their
views despite intervening cases' apparently inconsistent decisions; the revisiting of rules adopted and abandoned in the
past. I give some recent examples in the margin. 43 For all of
U.S. 145 (1968), that the state and federal rules must be identical, but it had not
decided what the rule is. Eight Justices in Apodaca reaffirmed the position that state
and federal rules must agree; five Justices concluded that federal juries must be
unanimous. But because one of the five, Justice Powell, also thought that state and
federal rules could be different, the Court held that state juries need not be unanimous.
This has been denounced as "illegitimate." Note, Plurality Decisions, supra note 3,
at 1133. But consider what would have happened if the first decision, instead of
holding that state and federal rules must be identical, had held that state juries need
not be unanimous, the second had decided that state and federal rules must be
identical, and the third had posed the question of unanimity in federal cases.
Or take National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (i949),
a case decided 3-2-4. It presented the question whether Congress may authorize
federal courts to hear suits between residents of the District of Columbia and citizens
of a state under the diversity jurisdiction of article Mn. Three Justices concluded that
the District is not a "state" for constitutional purposes and thus that article III cannot
support jurisdiction, but that Congress may act under article I and grant the article
III courts some jurisdiction not authorized by article Mn. Two Justices thought that
article III absolutely bans the assumption of any non-article-rn jurisdiction but that
residents of the District of Columbia are citizens of a state for purposes of article III.
Four Justices reasoned that District residents are not citizens of a state, and they
agreed with the two that article III prohibits Congress from granting jurisdiction not
there provided. At the end of the case, then, District residents are not citizens of a
state (7-2), and so there is no article III jurisdiction (7-2); courts established under

article III may not assume any jurisdiction unless provided in that article (6-3). The
Court ordered an article III court, nonetheless, to adjudicate a suit between District
residents and citizens of a state (5-4). What does stare decisis compel the Court to
do the next time District residents file such a "diversity" suit and the same problem
is presented?
42 In some approaches to adjudication, the result should depend on the mores of
the community at the time of decision. See, e.g., Perry, NoninterpretiveReview in
Human Rights Cases: A FunctionalJustification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278 (1981). If
this is an appropriate method, the outcome of a case may depend on the time at
which the dispute is resolved because mores change over time. But I assume for
current purposes that mores (and the legal positions of the Justices) are unchanged.
Path dependence makes the outcome turn on the order of decision even though nothing
of arguable importance to the decisions changes.
43 Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion), with Doe v. Common-

wealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 9o (1976), aff'g mem. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975)
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the objections to this outcome, it seems preferable to an aggravated form of path dependence, under which the Court
adopts and adheres to positions that a majority of the Justices
find constitutionally untenable.
3. Strategic Voting. - All of the examples I have used so
far assume that every Justice voted honestly, in accordance
with his own conclusions. But Justices need not do so; one
Justice may improve the result, as he sees things, by voting
strategically.
In the establishment clause example, group I prefers rule
A to rule N and rule N to rule B. The three Justices who hold
this position know from discussions how their colleagues have
evaluated the constitutional arguments. They know that if
they vote honestly the Court will cycle endlessly among the
rules, and that if stare decisis is invoked to end the cycling
they may well lose entirely. If rule A is matched against rule
N in the first case, A will prevail, and then in the next case
B will dominate A. The least preferred rule, as group i sees
things, becomes entrenched. Anticipating this result, group i
may decide to vote for rule N in the first case. Rule N will
then prevail; there will be no cycling. In this sense strategic
voting, concealing one's real conclusions, is a cure for the
44
cycling of outcomes.
To call voting "strategic" is not necessarily to invoke a
pejorative. The Court's critics are asking the Justices to vote
strategically when they say that some Justices should subordinate their own legal views to those of others in order to
achieve a majority decision. But even when Justices comply
with this request, they cannot improve the Court's performance. When there are three positions, firmly held, among
the Justices, which ones should yield in order to achieve agree(state may prohibit certain private sexual activity); compare Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357 (1978) (state may withhold favors from a defendant who refuses to plead
guilty and may even up the ante in reply to the refusal), and Corbitt v. New Jersey,
439 U.S. 212 (1978) (same), with Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 2X (1974) (state never

may penalize someone for the exercise of a constitutional right or make the exercise
of that right costily), and Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (198i) (same). In these
cases a majority of the Court is steadfast, with some always voting in favor of and
some always against the asserted constitutional right, while a minority changes sides,
creating the apparent inconsistencies. The problem is not limited to constitutional
interpretation. Compare Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981) (two statutes
create distinct offenses that may be punished cumulatively if each requires proof of
a fact the other does not), with Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (198o) (statute
authorizing enhanced penalties for use of firearm in committing felony may not be
applied when underlying felony also allows same enhancement). See generally cases

cited supra notes 2 & 25 (fourth amendment and double jeopardy cases).
44 For a proof, see Rubinstein, Stability of Decision Systems Under MajorityRule,
23 J. ECON. THEORY I50 (,980).
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ment? There is no principle for making such a decision; each
Justice properly may conclude that someone else should yield.
If each one yields part of the time, the path of the Court's
decisions becomes unpredictable and erratic. In the establishment clause example, different patterns of yielding could produce any of the rules A, B, or N; and if all the Justices engage
in strategic yielding, the result is the same as if none does.
Invocation of stare decisis also may be a form of strategic
behavior. The Justices in group i may assert that their vote
for rule N rather than the preferred rule A is justified by stare
decisis. When some Justices follow stare decisis and others do
not, strategic behavior is at work. Those who follow earlier
cases selectively are strategic manipulators. 4 5 Those who always follow earlier cases in an institution that generally does
not do so will lose power relative to those who follow earlier
cases selectively. Justice Harlan and perhaps Justice Stevens
belong in this category. 4 6
The important point is not how one characterizes the decision to yield or not yield, to follow or not follow earlier cases.
It is, rather, that Justices may choose, for apparently legitimate
reasons, to cast votes for legal positions they do not hold. The
results are stable, but hardly desirable. If even one of nine
Justices votes strategically, the Court will take and adhere to
positions a majority of the Justices would reject as a matter
of first principles. One may criticize that Justice for manipulating the others, but it is hard to criticize the Court as an
institution for this outcome.
There is, moreover, no way out. One of the theorems of
the public choice literature demonstrates that no voting system
can be designed that is proof against strategic voting and the
problems it causes. The theorem is too technical to state fully
or prove here, but it is powerful. It was proved independently
by two economists, and it led a third to remark: "The impos41Compare Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651-52 (I979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (expressing disapproval of the existing rule but willingness to follow the principle
until the major precedent is overruled), with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255
(,977) (White & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (continuing refusal to
accept establishment clause test announced in earlier cases; casting deciding votes on
some issues on the basis of a different test), and Committee for Public Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (198o) (majority composed of Burger, C.J.,
and Stewart, White, Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., deciding establishment clause case on
grounds asserted to be the same as the governing test but in fact more like those
earlier offered by White & Rehnquist, JJ., in separate opinions).
46 See California v. Sierra Club, 1oi S. Ct. I775, I78I (x981) (Stevens, J.,concurring) (stating strong preference in favor of recognizing stare decisis); Florida Dep't
of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147,
I51-55 (I98I) (Stevens, J.,concurring).
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sibility theorem of Gibbard and Satterthwaite is so definitive
that it ought to cap a 2oo-year-old search for ' an
ideal voting
47
procedure: There is no ideal voting procedure."
C. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and Consistent Decisions
The examples I have used so far deal with the way in
which the Court addresses a single issue: the construction of
the establishment clause, the right of privacy, and so on.
Someone who believes that the Court has an obligation, as an
institution, to be consistent may insist that I have been too
selective and have stacked the examples. Surely, this critic
would say, the Court can be consistent as a rule, even if
bizarre counterexamples can be constructed. And the critic is
right in one sense. Nothing in the theory of public choice
supplies an explanation for a sudden
about-face when there
48
are only two possible legal positions.

A demand for consistency as a rule nonetheless asks the
impossible of the Court. Arrow's Theorem, for which he won
the Nobel Prize, considers a system of pooling individuals'
conclusions to produce a collective decision that obeys the
following five conditions:
i. Unanimity: If all people entitled to a say in the decision
prefer one option to another, that option prevails.
2. Nondictatorship: No one person's views can control the
outcome in every case.
3. Range: The system must allow every ranking of admissible
choices, and there must be at least three admissible choices
with no other institution to declare choices or rankings out
of bounds at the start.
4. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: The choice between options A and B depends solely on the comparison
of those two.
5. Transitivity: If the collective decision selects A over B and
B over C, it also must select A over C. This is the requirement of logical consistency.
The theorem proves that no voting system can satisfy the five
conditions simultaneously.
17 Feldman, Manipulating Voting Procedures, 17 ECON. INQUIRY 452, 472 (1979).

Feldman's article contains a short proof of the impossibility theorem, which was
proved initially by Gibbard, Manipulationof Voting Schemes: A General Result, 41
ECONOMETRICA 587 (1973), and Satterthwaite, Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social
Welfare Functions, io J. ECON. THEORY 187 (1975).
48 There is no explanation for contradictions of the sort observed in Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (igxi), and Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
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Arrow's Theorem will strike most people as counterintuitive. It states that circular preferences, path dependence, and
other problems are endemic to collective decisionmaking systems and, indeed, that they are produced by the very things
we find desirable in such systems. The power of the theorem
lies in the proof of such a counterintuitive proposition. Much
of the public choice literature arose from efforts to prove Arrow wrong. The efforts failed; the theorem is now accepted
without question. I omit a proof here not because the reader
should accept Arrow's result on faith, but because the proof
is complicated and has been replicated many times in the
49
public choice literature.
The principal criticism of the Court as institution is that
its decisions do not satisfy condition 5 - that is, they are
inconsistent. (I postpone for a moment the question whether
transitivity and consistency are the same thing.) Arrow established that any process for making collective choices that satisfies conditions i to 4 cannot also satisfy the transitivity condition. One of the five conditions must go unsatisfied in every
collective decisionmaking body. It is necessary, then, to look
at conditions i to 4 carefully in order to determine whether
the Court should be expected to satisfy them, and if not, which
50
should be abandoned.
The first two conditions appear to be essential parts of any
method of judicial decisionmaking. If all nine Justices conclude that the first amendment protects the right to wear black
armbands at school, that must be the Court's decision. Condition i means here that the Justices do not delegate their
authority to someone else. And condition 2, nondictatorship,
also holds. The Court cannot allow one Justice always to
decide the cases, to be the dictator, just because that Justice
believes very strongly in his position while the other eight find
hard questions to be close questions and are less sure of their
conclusions. Condition 2 means here that the Court is an
institution of collective choice, 5 1 that it decides by voting, and
that every vote has the same weight. People take it for granted
49 For a proof that avoids excessive notation, see D. MUELLER, supra note 32, at
i86-88.
50 Both D. MUELLER, supra note 32, at I88-2OI, and A. MACKAY, ARROW'S

THEOREM, THE PARADOX OF SOCIAL CHOICE (ig8o), contain thoughtful discussions
of the five conditions and the case for believing that each is an appropriate requirement

for a decisionmaking institution.
sl It is possible, of course, to have a Supreme Court with only one Justice. Then

the nondictatorship condition does not hold, and the other four can be satisfied.
Someone who places a high value on consistent decisions might believe that a singlejudge court, with all its costs, would be preferable to the prevailing state of things.
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that the vote of a Holmes or a Brandeis counts no more than
the vote of a Butler or a Byrnes.
The fourth condition - independence of irrelevant alternatives - restates the principle that intensity of convictions
does not count on a court and adds a new requirement: a
Justice should not choose one of the options before the Court
because of positions on other things that are not pertinent to
the dispute. If the Court is asked to decide the meaning of
the eighth amendment, its determination ought not to be influenced by the belief of one Justice that the provision was not
properly adopted; still less should the decision be influenced
by the strongly held belief of one Justice that the negligence
system is a wicked way to handle automobile collision cases
or that plaintiffs with red hair (or black skin) ought to lose.
In any judicial system, irrelevant alternatives must be disregarded. Logrolling, 52 one way of handling intensity of preferences about "extraneous" matters in legislative systems, is
excluded; so too is bribery.
That leaves the third condition, range. Now it might seem
that a system for deciding cases ought not to admit any collection of views and ought not to allow the Justices to rank the
alternatives in any order. To allow such open-ended positions
and rankings seems to say that there are no legal rules, that the
Justices just vote their conceptions of The Good and disregard
any written documents they purport to construe. Because
everyone believes that some arguments and choices are closed
to Justices even if open to members of Congress, it apparently
becomes necessary to reject condition 3, thus saving the condition of logical consistency.
It is not possible, however, to reject condition 3 with such
dispatch. It is not an especially stringent condition. That one
option or one ranking of options is inadmissible does not negate
the condition. Range holds as long as at least three options
remain and these three may be ranked in any order (that is,
that the choices may be multi-peaked). So the fact that an
option such as interpreting the establishment clause to allow an
official national religion is conceded by all to be out of bounds
does not negate the condition; the three options of absolutism,
neutrality, and balancing are enough.
Because the range condition depends on the existence of
three choices, which may be ranked in multi-peaked fashion,
Arrow's Theorem explains inconsistent decisions only if many
legal disputes involve such options and rankings. Certainly
-2

Logrolling is a form of strategic voting, and its presence could negate condition

4. See also infra note 63.
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some disputes do not; there may be only two plausible options,
and even when there are three, the Justices may rank them in
single-peaked ways.5 3 But it is equally certain that many
disputes are characterized by three choices held in multipeaked ways. The examples I have given based on the establishment clause and the right of privacy illustrate the point.
Multi-peakedness becomes more and more likely as the
number of dimensions of choice increases.5 4 Even when the
Justices' conclusions in each dimension are single peaked, the
combination may have many peaks. And legal disputes often
require choices in many dimensions.5 5 A given constitutional
case may require the Court to consider the intersection of
several provisions, each embodying several values and each
with a distinctive structure. There are at least as many dimensions of choice as there are values (or provisions) in question.
Antitrust law provides a useful example. Justices have
been divided about the utility of bright line tests and about
the objectives of antitrust law. Some Justices believe the per
se doctrine (a bright line test) should be employed frequently;
others conclude that the rule of reason (a balancing approach)
is preferable. Some Justices think that the statutes call for
consideration of a multitude of economic, social, and political
factors; others that only considerations of allocative efficiency
count. In any given antitrust case, then, there are at least
four admissible approaches (per se rule for political values; per
se rule for efficiency; rule of reason for political values; and
rule of reason for efficiency). There will be further subdivisions, but the example is enough to show how the opportunity
for multi-peaked preferences arises here and in many other
disputes as well. Whenever the Court is grappling with the
intersection of two or more statutes, constitutional provisions,
or principles, there are bound to be inconsistencies in its answers - as there surely have been in the antitrust decisions.
Even when choices have multiple dimensions, the Court
might escape multi-peakedness if Justices were appointed from
among a group with similar background and training. In some
legal systems judges are promoted from court to court in a
way that screens out those whose views are distinctive; perhaps
53 See supra p. 816 (table of multi-peaked preferences). If group 3 ranked the
choices N, A, B, the preferences would be single peaked. For an argument that at

least some disputes have only one admissible choice, see Michelman, Politics as
Medicine: On MisdiagnosingLegal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1224 (i98i).
54 See D. MUELLER, supra note 32, at 195.
ss Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 394-404

(1978).
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such selection processes hold to a minimum the number of
cases that will be subject to Arrow's Theorem. But the Justices are not promoted from lower courts by a method that
rewards conformity with prevailing norms; to the contrary,
Presidents often appoint particular Justices because they value
the new Justices' different perspective on legal affairs.
The appointing process ensures that Justices will have
multi-peaked responses to many issues. But even if Justices
were chosen for conformity to some single method of adjudication - if all Justices agreed on a single method of determining which choices are out of bounds - that would not
ensure consistent decisions. Suppose, for example, the Justices
were to agree that the structure of the Constitution is the sole
standard for assessing the meaning of the text. That would
enable them to resolve with dispatch many questions the Court
now finds troubling. But the resolution of old questions would
call forth new ones. Cases would arise in which the text was
unclear, the history cloudy, the principles in conflict. These
cases might never before have been seen to be hard, but they
would be hard for Justices who decided cases as these hypothetical Justices did. For reasons I discussed in Part II, the
Court deals with the hardest questions, the ones likely to
produce disagreement. The process of evolution of legal rules
ensures this disagreement. 5 6 And many of these hard cases
would have at least three choices, with no restrictions on the
ranking of these choices. No matter how great the agreement

56 See supra pp. 805-07. The process is nicely illustrated by some of the Court's
recent interstate commerce cases. The Court has been reworking its treatment of the
negative implications of the interstate and foreign commerce power. See Hellerstein,
Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce Clause, and State Control of Natural
Resources, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 5i. The early cases in the series were easy for the
Court, and decisions were unanimous or close to it. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (i979); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979), overruling Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); Department of Revenue

v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978), overruling Joseph v.
Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947); Complete Auto Transit, Inc.

v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), overruling Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S.
602 (195i); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976), overruling Low v.
Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (i872). But the announcement of new principles just
moved the line of uncertainty between the permitted and the prohibited, and it took
only a few years for hard cases at the new line of uncertainty to arrive. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, io S. Ct. 2946 (i98i) (6-3 decision, with
one of the six dubitante); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 449 U.S.
ii19 (198i), affig by an equally divided Court 85 Cal. App. 3d 763, 149 Cal. Rptr.
750 (1979); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (5-4 decision). See generally
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 121-32 (i96i) (discussing the open texture of

legal rules).
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of the Justices on these fundamental principles, the hardest
cases still would satisfy the range condition.
It is most unlikely, though, that the Justices will be able
to reach agreement on fundamental principles of constitutional
interpretation. There is no agreement on such matters within
the legal profession. Some would choose strict adherence to
the language of a statute or constitutional provision, coupled
with analysis of the legislative debates; others would choose a
form of cost-benefit analysis; still others would choose some
form of philosophical or natural law approach. There is no
device for ruling any set of choices out of bounds and refusing
to count the votes of Justices who do not conform to these
decisions.
I do not argue that no choices are out of bounds. Far from
it. I would argue vigorously that the Court must discover and
carry out the design of any given provision; that cost-benefit
and moral concerns play no legitimate role in the process
(unless the drafters instructed the Court to incorporate them);
that the "evolution" of society after a provision has been
drafted should be ignored by the Court.5 7 But I am probably
in the minority in favoring such an out-of-bounds rule, and
neither I nor anyone else has a method for insisting that the
Justices honor such a rule. The Supreme Court is our society's
device for deciding that certain choices are out of bounds.
This implies that the Justices themselves are not constrained
by an out-of-bounds rule and ought not to be. Such a rule
could constrain the Justices only if some body were authorized

-7 See Easterbrook, Due Process and Parole Decisionmaking, in PAROLE IN THE
rg8oS, at 77 (B. Borsage ed. i98i); Easterbrook, Privacy and the Optimal Extent of
Disclosure Under the Freedom of Information Act, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 775, 783 n.39
(198o); cf. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution (forthcoming in University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 49) (arguing that the
approach to constructing a provision should depend on its source - whether general
public benefit or interest group politics). In saying that the Court must follow the
design of a provision, I do not necessarily mean the intent of its drafters. Public
choice principles suggest that the "drafters," as a group, may have no consistent
intent. The written product nonetheless may have a structure that governs questions
of interpretation.
Scholars who protest that the intent of the Framers is undiscoverable, e.g., Brest,
supra note 30; Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981), are
only rediscovering Arrow's paradox. They use the conundrums of preference aggregation to argue that judges are free to enforce "rights" that now seem part of just
government. But this is a non sequitur. The problems of preference aggregation no
more support additional powers for judges to override legislative judgments than they
support additional power for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to do so, or for Congress to
override judicial judgments. The fact that we cannot discover "an" original intent of
the framers does not mean that the document they wrote lacks a structure allocating
powers in a determinate way.
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to refuse to count the votes of a Justice who selected an
inadmissible option. Yet how would that body make these
decisions? To decide what is out of bounds is effectively to
decide the case before the Court; the body that made the outof-bounds decision for the Justices would acquire the same
functions as the Supreme Court and would acquire its problems as well. After all, who would restrict the range of the
choices of the boundary-setting body? Because the Court,
almost by definition, is not subject to an external agency that
restricts the ordering of its members' conclusions - and it
ought not to be - we are driven to say that the range condition holds for the Court, that it ought to hold, and that it
applies to a substantial number of the disputes that the Court
must resolve.
Before concluding that conditions i to 4 hold, though, I
think it is appropriate to consider once again the function of
stare decisis. Perhaps earlier decisions of the Court establish
which choices are out of bounds (so that in every case there
are only one or two admissible options) or compel singlepeaked rankings of legal conclusions; then condition 3 does
not obtain. Or perhaps the Court's earlier decisions play the
role of dictator. The sitting Justices may be painted as the
visible hands of this dictator, so that condition 2 does not
hold.
This position would be only superficially plausible. Precedents do not dictate results of hard cases; rather, cases are
hard and arrive at the Court precisely when precedent has no
compelling message. The decision in the 1973 abortion cases
did not dictate the results in cases challenging statutory restrictions on the funding of abortions, statutes requiring parental or spousal consent, statutes requiring parental notification, statutes requiring warnings about risks, and so on. The
1973 cases surely suggested directions and important considerations, but it would be foolish to say that they contained the
answers.
It is more plausible to say that precedent sets an out-ofbounds rule, albeit not an enforceable one. But how did the
precedents come to be? Each is the result of earlier precedents
and other considerations. The earlier precedents were created
without the benefit of the rules supposedly contained in the
stock of precedents that exists today. These earlier precedents,
then, were created while condition 3, range, obtained for the
Court. As a result, the earlier precedents could not be expected to comply with condition 5, logical consistency.5 8 Yet
s8 For surveys of the Court's early constitutional decisions that show the Justices
contradicting themselves again and again, see Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
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if the earlier precedents are bound to contain some inconsistencies, they set no useful rule. Given a proposition and its
opposite (i.e., two inconsistent decisions), one can "prove"
anything one likes. Reliance on precedent thus cannot overcome the application of Arrow's Theorem to the Court. And
even if it could, it is far from clear that society would gain
from its employment to this end; recall from Section B of Part
IlI that one principal result of stare decisis is to make constitutional doctrine depend heavily on essentially arbitrary circumstances such as the order in which the Court considers
cases.
Conditions i to 4 thus seem inescapable and condition 5 transitivity - therefore cannot be satisfied. One final question
needs attention here: Is transitivity the same thing as consistency? It both is and is not. Transitivity is the condition of
logical ordering plus path independence: 59 if value A dominates
B and B dominates C, then A must dominate C. Without
transitivity, consistency is impossible. But transitivity does
not exclude all logical problems; even when transitivity holds,
plain contradictions may exist. Transitivity has nothing to say
about the question whether A may co-exist with not-A. In
other words, Arrow's theorem is not about cases in which
there are only one or two possible outcomes. 60 (The paradoxes
of voting discussed earlier, however, are quite capable of explaining flat contradictions.)
The Court's critics do not waste their ammunition on the
easy cases such as judicial self-contradiction when there are
only two plausible outcomes. The interesting cases of inconsistency involve tensions across many cases; the customary
criticism takes the form of extracting from a case the values
or principles that must have produced the decision and objecting to the Court's use of a different ordering of values or
principles in some other case. Objections of this sort are arCourt: 1798-1801, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 8ig (ig8i); Currie, The Constitution in the

Supreme Court: x8ox-1835 (forthcoming in University of Chicago Law Review, vol.
49). Inconsistency has been present in the Court's cases from the beginning.
s9 K. ARROW, supra note 31, at 13-14, 118-20.

60 1 have made this point above, see supra pp. 825-26, in discussing the range
condition. See also Sen, Social Choice Theory: A Re-examination, 45 ECONOMETRICA
53 (1977). It may seem that all adjudication has only two outcomes (the plaintiff wins
or he does not), so that Arrow's Theorem is inapplicable. But this would be incorrect
for two reasons. First, the court may choose from more than two options. The
plaintiff may win nothing, a little, or a lot, and on one of many different rationales
with different implications for other cases. Second, Sen's demonstration applies only
when the collectivity's choices are strictly limited to two outcomes. If there are more
than two outcomes (A, B, and C, for example), Arrow's Theorem is fully applicable,
even if outcomes are compared only in pairs (i.e., A v. B, B v. C, C v. A).
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guments that the Court's opinions, as a body, do not satisfy
the transitivity condition. These objections go beyond attacks
on particular decisions and challenge the Court's general consistency (which critics often associate with responsibility and
"court-ness"), and it is exactly these objections that Arrow's
61
Theorem forecloses in many cases.
The conclusion of this analysis is unsettling, as any application of Arrow's Theorem is unsettling. I have argued that
conditions i to 4 hold for the Supreme Court. As a result,
condition 5, general logical consistency, cannot hold. Any
general criticism of the Court, as an institution, for rendering
inconsistent decisions is untenable. At least some inconsistency, and probably a great deal of inconsistency, is inevitable.
One implication of the inevitability of inconsistency is that,
as time goes on and the stock of precedents grows, the Court
is likely to assert broader powers to review the substantive
decisions of the other branches. The availability of inconsistent precedents allows the Justices to "prove" anything they
like, without fear of contradiction. The Court then either must
return to first principles (disregarding its precedents) or decide
cases on the basis of noninterpretive methods, such as beliefs
about social consensus or the Justices' own fundamental values
(the only course left open by the conflicting precedents). It is
unlikely that the Justices would do the former. I find it curious
that scholars and others who oppose noninterpretive modes of
judicial decisionmaking also appear to favor greater reliance
on stare decisis; 62 given the existence of inconsistent precedents, the two desires are not compatible.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Some of my colleagues suggested, while we were discussing
the application of Arrow's Theorem to the Court, that it would
be inappropriate to end on such a negative note. What is left
for legal discourse? The answer, I think, is: Almost everything
that was there before. True, it is not possible to suggest some
new, improved way of criticizing the Court. A powerful impossibility theorem shuts off institutional criticism. It does
not, however, affect other kinds of criticism.
61

Some approaches to jurisprudence depend on the belief that a conscientious

judge can extract a rule from existing cases if he tries hard enough - that is, they
depend on the belief that earlier decisions are consistent and thus satisfy the transitivity
condition. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130, 279-90
(,977); L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
62

See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 30.
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As I suggested at the outset, nothing in Arrow's Theorem
forecloses arguments based on first principles. One may contend that the Court is wrong, when the criteria of wrongness

may be found outside the Court's decisions. A critic may also
say that the Court flubbed a problem to which there were only
two admissible outcomes; in such cases range does not hold,
and the critic may insist on consistent decisions. The critic

could suggest that the nature of the Court should be changed
so that consistency becomes possible. 63 Or the critic may assess the performance of individual Justices. Because each Justice is dictator of his own decisions, he can satisfy the other
conditions without logical contradiction, and he may be faulted
for falling. There is no reason why we cannot ask each Justice
to develop a principled jurisprudence and to adhere to it consistently. What we cannot do is ask the same of the Court,
as an institution.
Calls for the Court to be united and to be consistent in all
things are forms of utopian argument. Utopian arguments
have been important in the development of political and legal
theory, but we should not be deceived into believing that
Utopia can be achieved. As usual, the perfect is the enemy of
The Good, and excessive concern with utopian criticisms of the
Court may divert us from useful ones.
63 See supra note 51. It is possible to suggest other changes. The purchase and
sale of votes (bribery or aggravated logrolling) could negate condition 4 and lead to
transitivity. Or if the transitivity condition is replaced with a demand for "acyclicality" - that is, stability - of decisions, the Court could satisfy the other four
conditions with a few modifications. As I showed above, see supra pp. 815-21,
stable decisions could be achieved if we are willing to tolerate path dependence and
are willing to adopt a method of ensuring the power of stare decisis. Many scholars
have concluded that this can be achieved with a dose of oligarchy - that is, giving
a coalition smaller than a majority the power to block any decision. So, for example,
"acyclicality" could be achieved with a rule under which any two Justices could block
the Court from reaching a decision to overrule (or limit) an earlier case. I leave it for
others to debate whether a Court characterized by oligarchy would be an improvement
over a Court that fails the transitivity condition.
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